Forced movement of preference orders in a civil war termination process through third-party intervention by broek, E.J. van den
1 
 
 
 
Forced movement of preference orders in a civil war 
termination process through third-party intervention. 
 
 
 
What circumstances favour the emergence of two-party cooperation when 
considering  the dynamics of cooperation under anarchy in an intrastate 
territorial conflict? 
 
 
Name: E.J. van den Broek 
Student number: 1141155 
E-mail address: 
e.j.van.den.broek@umail.leidenuniv.nl 
Instructor: Dr. M.S. Spirova 
Second reader: Dr. C. Jentszch 
Course: Master Thesis seminar 
Date: January 12, 2017 
Word count: 9826 (incl. bibliography) 
 
 
 
Purpose of study: Show that credible commitment theory is able to ensure domestic 
cooperation under anarchy by forcing opposing parties out of conflict deadlock. This is done 
by means of macro-level analysis of forced movements of preference orders in civil war. 
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Summary 
 
This thesis combines the Cooperation Under Anarchy strategy model by Kenneth Oye with the 
Theory of Credible Commitment by Barbara Walter to show how third party intervention can 
force movements of preference orders of two conflicting parties in violent domestic conflicts over 
territory. This is done by applying Credible Commitment Theory axiomas to a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game model of Deadlock. The new combined model is subsequently applied to the 
East-Timor civil war settlement by means of a case study to show how the dynamics derived 
from the conceptual model are adapted to a real world casus. The model shows positive 
applicability in explaining successful conflict settlement and is reversely also provides an 
explanation for civil conflict continuation. 
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Introduction 
 
The continuing involvement of third-party states in a number of extremely violent civil wars has 
given the conflicts an increasingly globalised character. The number of intrastate conflicts, of 
which numerous started in the 1950's due to a high number of wars of independence and other 
post-colonial conflicts, rose to a peak in the 1990's (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010: 4). After this peak 
in the number of civil conflicts, a quick decline followed. While the definitive reasons of this 
decline are still debated, it did point out a number of important new trends in post-conflict 
resolution (Kalyvas & Ballcells 2010: 5). While a number of conflicts got terminated by decisive 
military victories, others such as the civil conflict in Northern Ireland and the Balkan Wars were 
settled by means of peaceful dispute resolution. The way in which actors decide on the final 
termination of civil conflicts holds interesting material for analysis. Civil wars have often been 
resolved due to one-sided military victories that have either led to a complete annihilation of one 
of the parties involved in the conflict or resulted in a peace treaty, declaration of independence or 
in case of a conflict over government rule, some type of consociational system of domestic 
cooperation. The study of the termination of civil wars has gained less attention in the academic 
world compared to studies about why civil wars start. Nonetheless, knowledge about the historic 
dynamics of civil war termination could enhance future actions with regards to on-going 
conflicts. The use of case studies and qualitative research methods are therefore particularly 
applicable to test models of conflict termination. The use of tools of rational choice is able to 
provide observers of civil war termination with interesting insight in the dynamics of conflict 
termination. The combination of these tools with the analysis of case studies has been referred to 
by Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast as ‘analytic narrative’ (Gerring 2013: 3). For this 
thesis I will use a model designed by Kenneth Oye called Cooperation Under Anarchy and 
combine it with Barbara Walter’s Credible Commitment Theory to show how third-party 
intervention can affect preference orders in the termination of civil war. The model is applied to 
the conflict on the independence of East-Timor that settled in 1999 to show how the proposed 
dynamics are observable in a real world casus. The research shows that the threat or actual 
application of a third party intervention can alter the preference structures of parties involved in 
the conflict. This can force parties out of situations of ‘Deadlock’ into mutual cooperation for 
peace. 
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Game theory in civil war settlement 
 
As with a lot of cases of conflict or violence in the study of political science, any two opposing 
parties have opposing strategies and interests. The basic strategies of thought can therefore be 
centralized as common models in which rational actors act and are assumed to make similar 
choices in similar chains of events. Kilgour and Hipel state that (2010: 203): “Virtually all 
methods of conflict analysis are rooted in the non-cooperative game theory of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern”.  The methods of analysis of rational action derive their general knowledge about 
actor strategies of action from this game theory. The widespread use of the rational actor models 
for explaining collective rational behaviour as a group within a social setting in particularly 
includes the application of this model of thought for violent behaviour. 
 
The methods of the study of social conflict are in general divided between two schools of thought 
(Vahabi 2009: 819). The Neo-Classical school centres on the conceptual models of rationality and 
maximization of power within a social conflict situation. Downside of these models is that it 
lacks the inclusion of coercive models that stress the interaction of actors with regard to external 
influences, as the models are limited to the application of economic behaviour instead of socio-
political behaviour. The second school of conflict theory is the Public Choice School (Vahabi 
2009: 820). Models derived from this school generally extend further than studies of economic 
conflict in their use of systemic micro-analysis, and are therefore also applied to situations of 
social conflict such as revolutions and ethnic conflict. 
  
The core assumption of Rational Actor Models is that individuals have self-interested behaviour 
In practice this means that behaviour follows certain goals, such as the will to survive.  Besides 
that comes the maximization of welfare, being either material or immaterial. The labelling of 
behaviour as ‘rational’ derives from the constant cost-/benefit analysis that individuals make. 
Rational behaviour is therefore thought to provide the highest possible benefit for the lowest 
possible cost with the goal of maximizing gains and minimizing loss.  Within a strategy model of 
two competing parties in a civil war, anarchy is the leading concept in explaining the theoretical 
space in which actors are involved. This statement follows the outcome of the rational behaviour 
pattern in one of the most well-known game theory models: the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The cross-
paternal model behaviour of the individual versus the collective will always lead the individual to 
5 
 
Free Riding, or non-cooperation, while taking chance that the collective will provide for non-
excludable goods in the form of peace. As every actor is thought to follow the same rational 
pattern, the collective outcome will always be non-cooperation. However, there are theories that 
solve non-cooperation, but they always require third parties. Olson stresses that collective action 
is inapplicable to large groups, again due to the Free Rider problem, but as conflict analysis 
generally only involve a small number of actors, the solving of collective action problems to 
create a peace settlement is applicable. The alternative that Olson provides is the availability of 
selective incentives to change party preferences, but this is only available when provided by an 
actor who has the power to coerce another actor in participation (Olson 2009: 63). Therefore this 
does provide opportunities of analysis for behaviour in conflict situations where coercive power 
was applied by external actors. Furthermore the order of action in non-cooperation games is 
difficult to establish, resulting in constrains to the strategic action choice of when to act, as being 
first mover may be both advantageous or disadvantageous to the actor involved (Kilgour and 
Hipel 2010: 204). 
   
The preference of any party in a two-party armed conflict will be to pursue its own value to the 
maximum obtainable gain, which is a full military victory and political domination. The 
assumption in case of conflict is that the baseline at any point in time is the continuation of armed 
conflict. In the end, the interest of both parties is to end the violent stalemate in favour of its own 
interest. The continuation ensues a situation in which both parties have conflicting interest, and 
have no propensity to alter their situation towards an outcome that could favour the opposite 
party. Any situation where at least one of both parties prefers arming or fighting over disarming 
and negotiation will result in the absence of mutual gain or interest.  This situation of the absence 
of a mutual interest is referred to by Oye as a situation of 'Deadlock' (1986: 6). He stated that 
(1986: 7): “when you observe conflict, think Deadlock, the absence of mutual interest, before 
puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized”. When considering this, the research on 
underlying factors of the continuation of conflict as opposed to peace initiatives is deemed 
obsolete if any side lacks the interest of settlement over conflict. Defying a situation of Deadlock 
is virtually impossible considering the axioma of the maximisation of gains. The situation of 
Deadlock is schematically shown in figure 1. As actors are considered rational, and therefore will 
follow the same strategy pattern at any given time, the order of preferences is similar for both 
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parties at any time too.  
 
Figure 1. 
 Party Y 
 
 
 
 
Party X 
  
Cooperate / Disarm / 
Negotiate 
 
Defect / Arm / Fight 
 
Cooperate / Disarm / 
Negotiate 
 
3,3 
 
1,4 
 
Defect / Arm / Fight 
 
4,1 
 
2,2 
Deadlock 
 
 
For any situation of war, regardless of the conflict being at inter- or intrastate level, I have 
designated four potential outcomes of the violent conflict, which are placed in order of assumed 
preference. For a party (P) referred to as 'PX', the preferred outcome is: PX Victory > Peace 
Negotiations > Continuation of Conflict > PY Victory. Logically, this order of outcomes can be 
ordinally valued as 4 > 3 > 2 > 1 for the respective non-numerical outcome. These four outcomes 
represent all the logical possible endings of any conflict. A minor alternative option would be to 
prefer continuation of conflict over peace negotiations, although this is very unlikely to happen. 
Only in a case where extreme grievances between conflicting parties exist is it likely that a party 
would prefer continuation of conflict over negotiations with another party.  To consider possible 
alterations in order of preferences is obsolete considering the potential results of alteration. The 
reason for this is that a unilateral, uncoordinated movement of any Party 'X' towards the 
disarmament or disbanding of combat forces, so change of interest to 3 > 4 and therefore a 'D' as 
policy (see figure 2) could lead to two potential outcomes:  
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1. Party 'Y' changes its interests accordingly to 3 > 4 > 2 > 1. Results in policy D – D for 
both parties, thereby ensuring outcome '3': Peace Negotiations. 
2. Party 'Y' continues its original preference order of 4 > 3 > 2 > 1 which leads to a situation 
of A – D, thereby ensuring outcome '4': Party 'Y' Victory 
 
As both parties are aware of the potential outcome of an uncoordinated movement, being that the  
change of interest to D > A could potentially lead to outcome 2. For the opposing party, the 
movement is to be considered irrational and therefore unlikely. Therefore, in the absence of 
mutual interest, cooperation under anarchy becomes inapplicable.  
 
Figure 2. 
Party X preference   
Party X Party Y Value 
A D 4 – Party 1 Victory 
D D 3 – Peace Negotiations 
A A 2 – Continuation of conflict 
D A 1 – Party 2 Victory 
 
 
Party Y preference   
Party X Party Y Value 
D A 4 – Party 1 Victory 
D D 3 – Peace Negotiations 
A A 2 – Continuation of conflict 
A D 1 – Party 2 Victory 
 
Party policy: A = Arm/Fight, D = Disarm/Negotiate 
 
Despite the rather negative preface that a situation of Deadlock, or military stalemate, provides, it 
gives the observer interesting insights in the strategy of conflicting parties. Breaching a situation 
of stalemate is therefore considered to be a goal to see if and how we can challenge this system of 
reasoning. In practice, finding a way to defy military stalemates and turning the violent situation 
in a long lasting peace can give the observer various insights in how to resolve on going violent 
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conflicts or prevent fragile forms of peace between opposing groups from escalating into 
violence. The challenge of how to reach a situation of domestic cooperation under anarchy 
therefor is of importance to gain insight in conflict dynamics. Multiple studies have tried to 
explain why reaching mutual cooperation in civil wars is difficult, but few have managed to 
discuss how the dynamics of war affect the rational of opposing parties. Especially in cases 
where a rebelling party pursues the gain of territorial autonomy or independence from a central 
state, cooperation is the only resort apart from a full military victory that is able to provide a rebel 
party with maximizing their gain. But unless the government party is not seeing a territorial 
separation as a breach of vital interest, it will resort to the use of violent force to prevent the rebel 
party from succeeding in its pursuit of gains.  
 
 
Research Question  
 
The research question that I will pursue to answer by the research presented in this thesis will 
therefore be: ‘What circumstances favour the emergence of two-party cooperation when 
considering  the dynamics of cooperation under anarchy in an intrastate territorial conflict?’. 
Unlike many previous works of research on the solving of domestic conflicts, this thesis will 
have a qualitative approach. The reason for choosing this approach over reviewing statistics of 
various conflicts to test hypothesis, is that I argue that the review of a small number of cases can 
provide better insight in the dynamics of conflict that are vital to resolving conflict situations. 
The following chapters will provide insight in how the use of game theory can clear up the 
dynamics of war, and which implications of rational thinking by conflicting parties are of 
importance to decide on strategies of action. The research will show both a technical section on 
hypothetical dynamics within a system of two conflicting parties, and an analysis of how these 
dynamics are in effect in real world situations of civil conflict. These real world situations will be 
portrayed by the use of a case study. The case study will be used to decompose the actual 
happenings into dynamics schemes. These schemes are then compared to the hypothetical 
schemes that have been derived purely from interpretation of the theoretical dynamics in game 
theory. 
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Credible Commitment Theory 
 
Despite the assumptions derived by the dynamics of Deadlock games as presented earlier, there is 
a solution that does seem to be able to provide with means that make cooperation under anarchy 
more likely. As proposed in figure 3, there are two puzzles that needs solving before stable 
cooperation under anarchy becomes viable. Both the prevention of unilateral defection from  
harmony and the enforcement of a common move out of situation of deadlock may be able to be 
solved by third-party intervention. Walter constructs this hypothesis in her theory of credible 
commitment  (Walter 2001: 6). In her previous work on conflict settlement, she (1997: 340) states 
that “third parties [...] can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and 
promises will be kept (or at least they can ensure that groups will survive until a new government 
and a new national military is formed).” This ensures that in a situation of harmony cheating is 
difficult and costly for both parties. If a third party intervenes in a situation of deadlock and 
credibly commits itself to the resolving of the conflict,  non-cooperation becomes difficult and 
costly for the defector. This involvement of a third party coercive actor applies to the assumptions 
presented by Olson on the solving of collective action problems or Free Rider behaviour in 
conflict situations. 
 
The article “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement” by Barbara Walter sets the absolute 
standard for the appliance of cooperation dynamics in the process of civil war termination. Her 
research surrounds the basic question of why domestic enemies tend to fail in processes of civil 
war termination by negotiated settlement (Walter 1997: 335). The hypothesis is applied to a set of 
41 cases of civil war in the 20
th
 century, which all have shown different termination processes. 
The main variables she used were the presence of negotiations and the outcome of the war. The 
latter being either a decisive victory by one of the parties involved or a successful settlement. 
Walter argues that the failure of civil war settlements between two rivalling parties is a likely 
outcome as long as the parties are not entirely sure that the result of cooperation will be a lasting 
situation. Due to the fact that  cooperation supposedly ensues a situation of disarmament and 
disengagement of military forces, the parties involved tie themselves to significant risks if the 
opposing party resumes its interest of defection (Walter 1997: 336). In a hypothetical situation 
where this would happen, a party that reduces its military strength or front line defences to submit 
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to a process of peaceful cooperation may find itself severely outnumbered in military sense when 
the opposing party suddenly resorts to surprise attacks instead of continuing cooperation in a 
peace settlement process. This uncertainty will be deeper elaborated on in the next section on 
conflict dynamics. As long as any of the parties has no full insurance that the opposing party is  
committing to the same situation of vulnerability as the party concerned, they will not abide to 
domestic commitment terms. And even in a situation where both parties are already involved in 
negotiations, a party has limited insurance that the opposing party will stick to the agreement 
once settled. As the domestic situation lacks any means of enforcement of peace agreements, 
uncertainty about rival intentions remains a risk factor for both parties involved (Walter 1997: 
336). This situation creates a puzzle for the way we have to look at potential opportunities for the 
termination of wars, and prevention of escalation through moves of unilateral defection. 
 
Two-party Conflict Dynamics 
 
To study the hypothetical conflict situation I modelled the dynamics involved in a game that is 
commonly known as the ‘Prisoners Dilemma’. Considering two-party games in the solving of 
strategies in wars, independent of the conflict being of inter- or intrastate nature, enables the 
observer to reason the potential movements of either of the parties in a given situation of 
potential conflict. Uncertainty about the rival intentions is key in the model, which presents 
potential strategies by means of outcome preferences. The exact extent of the model when 
applied to conflict will be explained later on, but the basics of the model and the implications 
they have for strategy options are shown in figure 3. For the consideration of strategies of parties 
involved in a conflict situation, common reason leads to two possible starting points from which 
the observer can start the analysis process of the potential movements.  
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Figure 3. 
 
The first possible starting point is the presence of an armed conflict in which the two parties 
involved have not yet seen themselves able to view cooperation as a more gainful interest over 
continuation of conflict. This situation of Deadlock, as I presented it earlier, assumedly can only 
result in a one-sided military victory. However, cases have been observed in which both parties 
were able to commit themselves to cooperation. Walter (1997: 337) found out that out of forty-
one cases of civil wars occurring between 1940 and 1990, 94% of the cases saw a cease-fire 
agreement at some point during the conflict, but only seventeen of the cases resulted in peace 
negotiations. Furthermore, out of these seventeen cases, only eight cases ended in a successful 
peace settlement between both parties (Walter 2007: 346). A decisive military victory by one of 
the parties therefore is by far the most common outcome of civil wars. Defying Deadlock 
therefore is a puzzle that needs to be solved to acquire more knowledge about the resolving of on-
going or future conflicts. 
 
In case of the second possible starting point, the two parties involved have already seen a period 
of violent conflict, but have for a reason (the specific reason is not yet of importance) decided 
either to come to a stalemate and continue in a situation of either permanent or temporary 
ceasefire or came to a resort through a commonly accepted peace agreement. But even in 
situations where opponents have agreed to enter negotiations, both parties still face uncertainties 
in the process of cooperation (Walter 1997: 336). The parties have no credible guarantee that the 
opponent will commit itself to the negotiated settlement in the aftermath of the conflict. Hidden 
 Party Y 
 
Party X 
  
Cooperate / Disarm / 
Negotiate 
 
Defect / Arm / Fight 
 
Cooperate / Disarm / 
Negotiate 
 
Harmony 
 
Unforeseen Defeat  
 
Defect / Arm / Fight 
 
Surprise Attack 
 
Deadlock 
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incentives or changed values can turn the opponent party into defection. Furthermore, as it is 
unlikely that parties have full insight in the capacities or incentives of the opponent during the 
negotiations process, they may lead themselves into a deal that is inherently negative for their 
own future interests (Walter 2007: 336). Hypothetical examples are pledges for greater autonomy 
in territorial questions, in which the grant of autonomy is not clearly defined by pre-set standards. 
This uncertainty of cooperation creates the first puzzle in resolving conflict situations: how to 
prevent unilateral defection when two parties have reached mutual cooperation? This situation of 
‘Harmony’, as it is referred to by Oye, is only preserved when both parties are aware of “the 
absence of gains from defection” (Oye 1986: 7). Schelling (2008: 224) states that “the worst 
military confrontation is one in which each side thinks it can win if it gets the jump on the other 
and will lose if it is slow”. When acknowledging this, defection from a point of harmony even 
becomes likely, as parties involved are afraid that if they are not quick enough in creating a 
credible condition in which cooperation can be mutually assured, they will leave themselves 
vulnerable to their opponent. Therefore they may resolve to surprise attacks, as parties fear a 
similar strategy by the opposing party that leaves them in a vulnerable position if their defensive 
capability is weak, which may leave them to an unforeseen defeat (Schelling 2008: 225).  
 
The understanding of situations of Harmony and Deadlock with regards to the dynamics of two 
opposing parties has important consequences to the solving of conflicts. When considering ways 
to create peace settlements that are both advantageous to the party’s interest and are also lasting 
in the long term, by making incentives to defect from common cooperation unlikely, there are 
two outcomes that need to be answered. As shown in figure 3, the first being the puzzle of how to 
prevent unilateral defection when parties have reached the point of harmony,  the second being 
the puzzle of how to force a common move out of situation of deadlock towards a situation of 
harmony. 
 
Walter (1997: 336) states that there are multiple alternative explanations that argue that a 
settlement through cooperation in civil wars is highly unlikely. Walter sums the explanations of 
power asymmetries, indivisible stakes, bargaining difficulties and opposing identities as factors 
that make a negotiated settlement difficult (Walter 1997: 336). The explanation of the 
asymmetries between two parties, in which case it assumed that a formal government party is 
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more powerful than a rebel party, is deemed unlikely as it underestimates the power of many 
rebel forces. A number of rebel forces have already proven to pose an overwhelming power over 
government parties in a number of historic cases. The government party supposedly has the 
ability to use means that are unavailable for the rebel opponent, thereby making armed stalemates 
unlikely, but external factors can severely interfere with the proposed explanations of this 
assumption (Walter 1997: 336). Examples are a number of cases of successful civil wars, such the 
communist revolution in Cuba in 1958 and the Algerian uprising in 1962. Indivisible stakes and 
vital domestic assets are also objectives of party preferences that are seemingly difficult to 
negotiate or bargain on. However, a number of post-war power sharing agreements, such as the 
integration of former rebel parties into formal state politics have been successful. Legalizing 
these parties and providing opportunities to transform to fully functional political bodies ensures 
that stakes vital to a party’s preference become accessible as part of a democratic system. 
Söderberg, Kovacs and Hatz (2016: 257) have analyzed the transition of armed groups from rebel 
groups to formal political parties. They argue that the adaptability of rebel movements to political 
parties is a hard challenge in the political peace process, but that it does provide with a more 
stable settlement. Sindre (2016: 196) states that “the links between internal organisational 
characteristics of armed groups and the post-war institutional environment are important 
determinants for the governance practices and adaptability to multi-party democracy by former 
rebel parties”. Virtually the same holds for domestic parties that have conflicting identities, such 
as ethnical or religious cultural divisions. Again, cases in which clashing domestic cultures have 
transitioned to violence have proven to be resolvable by applying consociational arrangements to 
the domestic political structure, as for instance shown by Arend Lijphart in his study of apartheid 
in South Africa (Lijphart 1985). 
 
 
Credible commitment and two-party conflict dynamics 
 
In the prospect of an unilateral defection by either one of the parties, a powerful third party can 
create counter measures that affect the preference order of a party. By either providing both 
parties with means that improve their gains from cooperation, or by threatening with the use of 
force to improve loss by non-cooperation, a third party mediator may take control over an 
unstable situation of domestic harmony (containing mutual cooperation). 
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Chang, Luo and Zhang discuss the relation of timing in games of strategic movement. As I briefly 
discussed in the section on game theory, timing and moving orders may affect strategy results and 
preference outcomes. Chang, Luo and Zhang suggest that the concept of timing is more important 
in sequential-move games, which represent action-reaction-action etcetera, than it is in 
simultaneous-move games such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma (Chang et.al 2015: 2). While this may 
be true for games in an economic conflict setting which Chang, Luo and Zhang are trying to 
explain, in military conflict the timing issue is of much less importance.  
 
The following section will show that a simultaneous movement is only represented in one case of 
potential third party intervention, which is the most simple movement a third-party can make to 
force conflicting parties out of deadlock. 
 
In addition to non-movement CC  CC, there is the potential of a movement CC  DC, which 
represents an unilateral defection by a party. This case represents a sequential moving order CXCY 
 DXCY. When the present third party Z intervenes with force to restore CC, this results in order 
CXCY  DXCY  Intervention PZ  CXCY. 
 
The enforcement of common move out of a situation of deadlock also seems a promising solution 
the end a violent stalemate. In this case, there are two potential options of movement: 
 
1. Either the third party (Z) enforces a move of both parties towards mutual cooperation, 
threatening both parties with the use of force when defecting, which result in an 
immediate move of DDCC. A move of this type represents a simultaneous moving 
order, as it is made unilaterally as PZ - (PX + PY).     
2. The third party PZ takes the sides of one of the parties involved (in this example PX), 
which creates a new party structure PZX.  A move of this type represents a sequential 
moving order, as it is made as PZX -  PZ - PY. In this case, the intervener can: 
a. Both improve the gains from cooperation for the party it prefers, so it prefers C 
>D, and force the opponent towards a situation in which it too prefers C>D. The 
moving order of interests therefore represents  DXDY  CXDY  Intervention PZ  
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 CXCY 
b. Support one of the parties into a military victory (DD), after which both parties 
may choose to move towards mutual cooperation (CC) in which the losing party 
has a strongly reduced say in the settlement. The moving order of interests 
therefore represents  DXDY  Intervention PZ  DZXDY  Victory PZX  CXCY. 
This situation still implies that containing harmony is needed, as a losing party 
may see continuation of conflict as a last resolve in the post-settlement situation. 
 
In general, the prospect of third party intervention becomes more likely if the stakes at play in the 
conflict coincide with the interest of other powerful states. Morgenthau (1967: 430) states that: 
“All nations will continue to be guided by their decisions to intervene and their choice of the 
means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests”. When stakes are 
threatened by either the escalation of violence or the by the way the conflict advances over time, 
the likelihood for a third party intervention becomes higher (Change et al. 2015: 2).  
 
Walter (1997: 340) does sum a number of vital indicators of credible commitment of the 
intervening party. The intervening party must have “self-interest in upholding its promise”, which 
indicates that there a certain gains at stake of the intervening party. These can be both material 
and immaterial. An example is the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979, 
where a communist revolutionary movement was about to overthrow the ruling Afghan monarch. 
In this case, the intervening party supported the revolutionary movement to ensure the prevalence 
of communist ideology over an authoritarian monarchy which showed a growing preference for a 
capitalist system  (Morgenthau  1967: 428). In the case of Vietnam, the United States were trying 
to prevent a communist uprising by the Vietcong from spreading further into South-Vietnam. 
Other examples of self-interest that Walter mentions are indicators of former colonial ties, 
geopolitical strategy, economic interests or alliances (Walter 1997: 340). The second indicator is 
the willingness to resort to the use of violent force if deemed necessary to resolve the conflict. 
Therefor the capabilities of the intervening party must include a sufficient military capacity to 
overpower an enemy force. This study of the theoretical dynamics of two conflicting parties 
acting in a system of anarchy has led to the following hypothesis that I will test using a case 
study:  
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Hypothesis:  
The breaching of conflict dynamics in civil war that make opposing parties prefer  
military stalemate over mutual cooperation is more likely if an outside power stepped in 
to guarantee a peace agreement. 
 
Case selection 
 
The selection of cases has been made with the use of UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset version 
2-2015 (Kreutz 2010). This dataset provides statistics about the termination of both internal and 
external conflicts since 1946. First, as derived from Sambanis’ definition of civil war, I selected 
cases that had more than 1000 battle-related deaths during the entire conflict and in at least one 
single year of the war (Sambanis 2001: 262; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010: 417). Second, I selected 
Intrastate armed conflicts in which the government of a state and one or more domestic 
opposition group(s) are involved, as the research targets domestic territorial conflicts. Third, the 
conflict has to have been concluded by means of a peace treaty. Fourth, the incompatibility of the 
conflict has to have been over a territorial conflict. Selection criteria resulted in twelve potential 
cases, of which I ruled out another four for additional reasons that were not registered in the 
UDCP database. These cases are for instance the Georgian territory of Abkhazia, which is 
effectively occupied by Russian armed forces, and Mauritania due to its negligibility in the 
Western-Sahara conflict. The remaining cases of the selection that are the most promising for 
analysis are the Indonesian conflict over East-Timor in 1999, the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict 
over its independence from Serbia in 1995 and the Serbian conflict over the independence of 
Kosovo in 1999. After a basic evaluation of these three cases, I finally selected the conflict over 
East-Timor independence for further analysis as it is the most-likely case to fit theory. The case 
represent a situation in which the actors involved on both sides of the conflict are relatively 
clearly presentable, in this case the Indonesian military and the East-Timorese independent 
movement as conflicting parties with the INTERFRET force as third-party intervener. This 
includes their proposed preference structures and motivations for consequential action strategies. 
Secondly, the conflict is well documented so a wide range of sources is available to evaluate the 
courses of action. 
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Case study: East-Timor 
 
The following analysis of the conflict over East-Timorese independence will begin with a brief 
history of governance over the island nation. This is important is the historical factors portray a 
number of interests of various states with regard to the long lasting conflict situation. After the 
historical analysis, the dynamics of the settlement process are presented with the application of 
the model introduced in this thesis. 
 
A brief history  
 
The history of the territory that is now known as East-Timor is predominantly shaped by its 
colonial rule. While the Portuguese derived its earliest trading posts on the Timor coastline 
around 1700, it did not fully colonialize the rough areas inland until 1912 (Kingsbury 2009: 33). 
The Portuguese had formally decided on the demarcation of territorial control with the Dutch 
colonials in West-Timor in various treaties in the 1850’s. Both the Dutch and the Portuguese 
struggled to gain control of the inland territory, and both organized military campaigns to subdue 
the inland population under colonial control (Kingsbury 2009: 35). Unlike the Dutch side of the 
island of Timor, the Portuguese rule never developed the economic presence beyond basic trading 
posts. The Dutch had developed profitable coffee plantations on the Western half of Timor, but 
the Portuguese struggles with the inland tribal population denied them from developing 
meaningful profitable export goods (Kingsbury 2009: 36). This form of low intensity colonialism 
on the eastern part of the Timor island remained until the beginning of the 20
th
 century. 
 
The changing political situation in Portugal, which saw the overthrowing of the Portuguese 
monarchy and the installation of a fascist dictatorship, had a strong impact on the Portuguese 
colonies. The colonial administration was brought directly under Lisbon rule, which subsequently 
strengthened all ties of the colonial presence in East-Timor (Kingsbury 2009: 38). The 
Portuguese colonial rule continued until the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, only to be 
interrupted by the Second World War. The Japanese occupation devastated much of the 
infrastructure and acts of indiscriminate violence and force labour led to the death of about 
60,000 Timorese inhabitants (Kingsbury 2009: 39).  In 1949, as result the Dutch decolonization, 
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West Timor became part of the new Indonesian independent state. From this point onwards, the 
Timorese population saw an almost continuous violent repression by the Indonesian central 
government. After the Portuguese administration had left East-Timor in the summer of 1975,  the 
Indonesian military started a violent campaign to integrate East-Timor in the Indonesian State 
(Kingsbury 2009: 49). The indigenous troops that supported the Portuguese colonial rule prior to 
its breakdown joint forces with the local tribal militia. This new military force, which was called 
‘Forcas de Defesa de Timor Leste’, or Falintil, was subsequently supplied with NATO material to 
strengthen their position of independence, which was declared unilaterally on the 28
th
 of 
November 1975 (Kingsbury 2009: 49). However, the UN refused recognition as it supported the 
annexation by Indonesia (McCloskey 2000: 3).  
 
On the 7
th
 of December 1975, the Indonesian started its military invasion to annex the Eastern 
part of the Timorese island. The military campaign was politically supported by both the USA 
and Australia (Scott 2005: 110). Days before, the East-Timorese pro-independence elite had fled 
the island and went into exile in Mozambique for the next 24 years (Kingsbury 2009: 50). 
However, the Falintil continued armed resistance until the 1990’s, effectively fighting a civil war 
for independence. The outbreaks of violence were often actions of revenge against Indonesian 
aggression against the indigenous population. Towards the end of the 1990’s the authority of the 
Indonesian ruler Suharto was dwindling, as both the economy and the states’ political situation 
became increasingly unstable. Suharto resigned from office in the spring of 1998. He was 
replaced by the former minister of technology and vice president Habibie, who held a more 
favourable opinion towards East Timorese self-determination (Kingsbury 2009: 67). Negotiations 
for either increased autonomy or complete independence were started towards the end of 1998. 
Habibie had announced that he would support East Timorese independence if the majority of the 
East Timorese population would want so. However, Habibie was not supported by the Indonesian 
military and police in this matter. As the support for the pro-independence movement of East-
Timor increased, so did the violent oppression by the pro-Indonesian security forces. 
 
On the 6
th
 of april 1999, militia associated with the Indonesian army attacked pro-independence 
activist in an event that became known as the Liquica massacre, killing up to an estimated 200rd 
people (Kingsbury 2009: 69). Short time after the massacre, Australia and the UN proposed the 
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installation of a peace keeping force, to oversee the process toward a popular vote for autonomy 
or independence to be held the same year. Indonesia refused this as they argued that they would 
be able to remain control over the unstable situation themselves. Nonetheless, on the 10
th
 of june 
1999, the UN established the UNAMET mission, charged with organizing an electoral 
commission to oversee the voting (Kingsbury 2009: 70). Although denied by the Indonesian 
officials, the Indonesian proxy militia continued it campaign of destabilisation in the weeks prior 
to the voting day. The militias burned down entire villages in the countryside and left nothing but  
red and white Indonesian flags on the remains as a sign of allegiance to the Indonesian state. The 
actual votes were cast on the 30
th
 of august, and on the 4
th
 of September, the result of the votes 
were announced, with 78,5% having voted in favour of East Timorese independence (Kingsbury 
2009: 73). 
 
Conflict dynamics in the conflict settlement process in East-Timor 
 
The day of voting will be marked as the point on which I will start my analysis of the resolving of 
the conflict. At this point, the situation remained an actual civil conflict. The armed resistance had 
been particularly low after the resignation of Suharto, as the Falintil elite saw the change of 
presidency of the Indonesian state as an opportunity seek peaceful means. The fact that 
independence was supported by the new Indonesian president enforced their beliefs. Xanana 
Gusmao, the commander in chief of Falintil, had by means of a press release in early spring of 
1999 ensured that he would order Falintil to cancel armed resistance if an UN peacekeeping force 
would intervene in the country (BBC 1999a). Short time after, he cancelled his statement of 
disarmament as no credible reaction of the international community had followed. He did 
however resumed his call for a UN force to provide stability to the country. On the 10
th
 of August 
1999, Gusmao ordered the pro-independence militia to resist provocations by the Indonesian 
military and its proxy militias in the weeks prior to the voting day (Robinson 2009: 147). This 
made the conflict situation at this point effectively a temporary military victory for the pro-
Indonesian forces. The violent campaign of the pro-Indonesian militia made it clear that 
cooperation with the pro-independence movement was never going to be an option. The 
Indonesian government publicly denied any acts of violence by the Indonesian security forces 
present in East-Timor, and blamed the Falintil militia for the indiscriminate violence against the 
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civilian population. The order of Gusmao to resist armed provocation by the pro-Indonesian 
forces is a move that is open to multiple interpretations with regards the vision presented here on 
gains and losses of preference movements. First, by resisting to fight the Indonesian security 
forces, the resistance movement was showing that it preferred cooperation over further 
continuation of the conflict. Their gains from choosing not to fight were increased by the 
prospect that the international community would react against the violence used by the 
Indonesian security forces. The prospect of gaining international recognition of their struggle 
with the Indonesian forces therefore prevailed over the prospect of a military victory, as Gusmao 
had already presented a proposal for a mediated resolution involving all major actors involved in 
the conflict (Kingsbury 2009: 58). However, it can be considered a risky move as the 
international support was not fully ensured. A neglecting of the signs by the international 
community could have eventually led to a military victor by the Indonesian forces. Presumably, 
the resistance would have reversed its move at some point if there had not come a reaction to 
support the move of cooperation by the resistance forces. Nonetheless, a move that could lead to 
a military victory of the opposing side is, according to the traditional Prisoners’ Dilemma game 
model, an irrational form of behaviour. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to Cooperation Under Anarchy, if Party 'Y' continues its 
original preference order of 4 > 3 > 2 > 1 when Party ‘X’ would change it to 3 > 4 > 2 > 1,  this 
action would lead to a situation of A – D, thereby ensuring outcome '4': Party 'Y' Victory. 
However if one of the parties, in this case Party ‘X’, is convinced that their potential gains from 3 
> 4 are higher than from 4 > 3, the movement may be considered rational after all. There are 
multiple factors that impact negatively on this rationality, such as the lack of full information 
prior to the move and the lack of credible assurance that the proposed reaction to their move will 
actually follow. The basic axioma of Cooperation Under Anarchy, which states that cooperation is 
only possible when two parties have mutual interest, still stands. The period of time after the 
casting of the vote for independence for East-Timor however showed that an enforcement of a 
change of interest is possible. 
 
In response to the result of the vote for independence, the pro-Indonesian Halilintar militia 
rampaged throughout the country, killing an estimated of 1400 people (Kingsbury 2009: 73). 
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Furthermore, an estimated 250,000 East-Timorese fled to West-Timor or the impregnable hills of 
the island. The Indonesian government send in another 1800 security forces just days after the 
voting, with the intention to restore order after the violence following to voting result 
announcement (BBC 1999b). Many Indonesian forces have however been accused of supporting 
the pro-Indonesian militia which were responsible for the violent rampages. As a reaction to the 
escalation violence, the UN staff responsible for the overseeing of the electoral process was 
evacuated to Australia. They staff had ensured that they would remain on the island after the vote 
to ensure the implementation of the outcome. The new situation on the island forced them to 
abandon their positions in fear of being captured by the pro-Indonesian militia (White 2008, 82). 
Shortly after the outbreak of violence, the Falintil militia got their intended reaction by the 
international community. The chain of events after the vote had gained international public 
attention. Public protests in Australia and Portugal ordered their respective governments to 
develop a credible reaction to the violence by intervening with force. The USA indicated to the 
Australian government that it preferred a leading role of the Australian forces in the intended 
intervention (White 2008: 83). In advance, the USA had contacted the Indonesian government 
that it would suspend military ties between the two states, and force them to accept an 
international peace keeping force to the island state to restore order (Kingsbury 2009: 74). The 
Indonesian government however still refused to accept an UN peace keeping force to intervene in 
East-Timor. But perhaps the most important threat made to the Indonesian government was that 
in case it would remain its position of refusal, the World Bank would severely cut funding to the 
state (Clear 2008: 228). At this time, the Indonesian government was still facing an economic 
crisis. It had been one of the foremost reasons for former president of Indonesia Suharto to resign 
from office. In addition, the IMF also suspended a planned meeting in Jakarta (Kingsbury 2009: 
74). In terms of the game theoretical dynamics, sanctions in economy, diplomatic and military 
affairs by the USA and various international institutions would severely lower the Indonesian 
gains from defecting a cooperation through the acceptance of intervention by a peace 
enforcement force. The dissertation of gains and losses of the various actors involved is showed 
in figure 4. 
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Figure 4. 
 Gains/loss from Indonesia 
 defecting 
Gain/loss from Indonesia  
cooperating 
Indonesia -Gains: loyalty of domestic elites with 
economic ties in East-Timor 
-Gains: regional prestige as powerful 
actor 
-Loss: severe economic and 
diplomatic sanctions 
-Loss: increased threat of violent 
military intervention 
-Gains: Continued funding by 
international organizations 
-Loss: possible domestic instability, 
might trigger other independence 
movements 
-Loss: economic exploitation of East-
Timorese territory 
East-Timor -Loss: potential military defeat by 
Indonesia 
-Loss: reducing resources due to 
conflict continuation 
-Gains: Independence, end of repressive 
governance. 
Foreign actors -Loss: potential need to spend 
military resources for violent conflict 
intervention. 
-Loss: potential economic negativities 
of sanctioning 
-Loss: potential loss of credibility as 
advocates of peace and stability 
-Loss: continued regional instability 
-Gains: regional stability 
-Gains: International prestige as 
coercive power 
-Loss: commitment of resources to 
international peacekeeping force 
International 
organizations 
-Loss: potential domestic and 
regional economic instability due to 
sanctioning 
-Gain: continuation of regional 
economic progress 
 
 
The thread with financial sanctions did have its intended effect. It forced the Indonesian 
government to change its position with regards to the acceptance of a UN force to restore order. 
When examining figure 4, the general conclusion would be that with the knowledge about 
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potential outcomes of Indonesian defection, all parties involved would prefer Indonesian 
cooperation of defection. Indonesia accepted the international peacekeeping force barely two 
weeks after the voting results were announced, and on the 20
th
 of September 1999, a Australian 
led multinational peace enforcement force entered East-Timor (Kingsbury 2009: 74). The 
taskforce was not UN led, but acted in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1264, 
which was adopted unanimously on the 15
th
 of September 1999. The main initial combat-ready 
taskforce, called INTERFRET, consisted of troops from Australia, New-Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Within 48 hours, the combined force was able to deploy almost 
3000 troops into East-Timor. They force had both naval and air combat assets at its disposal. In 
addition, an armoured and artillery unit was on high alert standby on Australia’s northern coast 
ready to be deployed when the violence would intensify or the Indonesian military would revolt 
against the INTERFRET force. The UN mandate enabled the force to use ‘all necessary means’ in 
support of the civilian UNAMET and additional aid relieve missions (Chesterman 2007: 196). 
This massive deployment is an indication that the peace enforcement force was able and willing 
to use credible force against any violator. In accordance with the credible-commitment theory 
developed by Walter, the deployment of the INTERFRET force showed that third-party states 
were willing to guarantee the safety and security of the newly formed independent East-Timorese 
state. Walter (1997: 345) mentions in her coding of here hypothesis on the success of credible 
commitment that “third-party security guarantees were defined as any implicit or explicit 
promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries”. She does however add in additional 
note to this statement that a commitment of troops by means of a peace enforcement force can be 
considered a credible threat to the side of the opposition (Walter 1997: 345). In this case, the 
international coalition did not necessarily warn the present Indonesian security forces of their 
intention to deploy a combat force if they would not stop their support for pro-Indonesian militia.  
 
The time between the adoption of the UNSC resolution for the deployment of a taskforce and the 
initial entry of peace enforcement troops was five days. The passing of the resolution can be seen 
as the explicit voicing of credible commitment to the East-Timorese independence movement. 
The little time between the voicing of commitment and the actual ‘show of strength’ by the 
INTERFRET coalition gave the Indonesian security forces and militia little time so overthink 
their potential options. Through the rapid deployment of the INTERFRET force, which had been 
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already put on standby immediately after the voting results announcement on the 4
th
 of 
September, the force also managed to capture a severe number of pro-Indonesian militia on the 
territory of East-Timor. Eventually, only the use of limited amounts of violence was needed to 
force remaining pro-Indonesian militia to abandon their arms and either flee to Indonesian West-
Timor or return to their native villages. After action reports state that about twenty minor 
skirmishes between INTERFRET troops and opposition militia have been reported during the 
deployment that lasted until February 2000, which resulted in one New Zealand casualty due to 
combat actions, and two Australian casualties due to illness or accident (Independent 2000). 
Bellamy and Williams (2010: 3) state that “the Australians calculated that the physical presence 
of this brigade would instill a sense of security and reinforce the idea that INTERFET was a 
force capable of protecting people, unlike the UNAMET observation mission”. The Indonesian 
armed forces left East-Timor on the 29
th
 of October 1999. The pro-Indonesian militia structures 
had been forcefully disbanded during the INTERFRET deployment. The deployment included a 
disarmament project of all militia involved, so including the pro-Independence Falintil militia. 
However the latter gained formal recognition as the new domestic security force in the 
developing state building process, and was therefore excepted from disarmament (Kingsbury 
2009: 98). 
 
The disbanding and disarmament of pro-Indonesian militia forces and the forced evasion of the 
Indonesian security forces is to be interpreted as a final move towards a stance of cooperation 
with the pro-Independence movement and the developing state bodies. As the latter had already 
adopted their preference of disengagement over conflict continuation, the situation has essentially 
reached a point of mutual cooperation. Visualized as a pattern of movement as presented in the 
introduction to options of movement in civil war interventions, the situation in East-Timor 
followed the following sequential pattern:  
 
DXDY  CXDY  Intervention PZ  CZXCY 
 
The INTEFRET intervention ensured that the Party ‘Y’, in this case the pro-Indonesian side, 
changed it preference order from PY Victory (4) > Peace Negotiations (3) > Continuation of 
Conflict (2) > PX Victory (1) to Peace Negotiations (3) > PX Victory (4) > Continuation of 
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Conflict (2)  > PY Victory (1). The sum of gain versus loss of converting to this preference order 
became higher through two factors. First, the economic sanctioning that was threatened by the 
World Bank and IMF severely increased the losses in case the party would not have realigned its 
preference order. Second, the prospect of military defeat against the far more powerful 
INTERFRET intervention force, which would not only have defeated them temporarily as 
militant force, but also affect their long term survival as an opposition movement. The only 
alternative explanation available that would possible result in a change of preference orders 
would be through a process of mediation. However, the likeliness of behavioural change in a 
mediation process is limited, as it would rely on full political commitment of both parties. 
Furthermore, a mediation process takes time and resources, which either one of the parties might 
not have been eager to commit to. Indonesia was unlikely to give up its claim on the territory of 
East-Timor if not to its own benefit in ways of economic policy or prestige claims (Kingsbury 
2009: 70). 
 
By choosing cooperation over defection, the pro-Indonesian movement ensured that it remained 
the possibility of continuing as political active movement. This situation still implies that 
containing harmony through mutual cooperation is needed, as a losing party may see continuation 
of conflict as a last resolve in the post-settlement situation. The UNTAET that oversaw the 
transition of civil administration and the UNMISET and UNOTIL peacekeeping missions ensured 
this harmony for the years following up to the INTERFRET intervention.  
 
The intervention in the East-Timorese conflict is also in accordance with the two vital indicators 
of credible commitment as presented by Walter, namely self-interest and sufficient military 
capability. On an Australian Defence Force website dedicated to the INTERFRET mission, the 
government (Gov.au) states that “It is in Australia’s vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, 
stable and democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading and respected role in 
the region. It is also in Indonesia’s own interests to ensure East Timor’s transition is a peaceful 
and orderly one. Australia’s efforts in building our relations with Indonesia are directed to that 
outcome.” It is most logical that Australia sees the stability of states in its periphery of vital 
importance. The island of Timor being just about 700km away from Australia’s northern 
shoreline gave the Australian government a credible interest in the resolving of the conflict as 
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security part of its geopolitical strategy. The second indicator, the sufficient military capacity to 
overthrow the targeted opposition force without having to engage in a long stretching conflict of 
atrocity was clearly met. At its peak, the INTERFRET force accounted for about 11,000 forces, 
half of which were of Australian nationality, the other major contributors being New-Zealand and 
Thailand. The force of pro-Indonesian militia was estimated to be around 12.000 members 
strong, but divided between more than twenty different groups of various strength. The majority 
of the militia were hired guns that had little intention to fight an overwhelming force, especially if 
the Indonesian regular armed forces would be forced to leave East-Timor, so only a limited 
number of hardline militia were actually threatening the INTERFRET forces (Frost and Cobb 
1999). As an additional indicator that hasn’t been presented by Walter I want to add host-state 
support as supplement to self-interest and military capability. One of the factors that lead to the 
successful intervention in East-Timor was the support the mission got prior to its deployment 
from the state’s population. Xanana Gusmao, the commander in chief of Falintil and popular 
leader of the pro-independence movement asked for a UN approved intervention force a number 
of times prior to the vote for independence. This indicates that the majority of the East-Timorese 
population favored the deployment of foreign armed forces to the country to restore peace.  
 
The mandate of the last peacekeeping mission UNOTIL ended in May 2005. In 2006 a mutiny 
within the East-Timorese government security forces led to a return of international troops to 
restore order. The 2006 crisis led to little casualties. As of today, Easter-Timor holds as stable 
democratic political situation. Despite the high poverty rates in the country, the economy is 
improving, with an average growth rate of 8% between 2006 and 2016 (tradingeconomics.com) 
 
Conclusion 
 
The settlement of the domestic conflict in East-Timor has shown that the use of credible 
commitment theory to the models of cooperation under anarchy is applicable. Comparable to the 
selective incentives that Olson has presented, credible commitment is able to construct a situation 
that is able to defy games of Deadlock. I therefore conclude that, in accordance with the 
hypothesis, the breaching of conflict dynamics in civil war that make opposing parties prefer 
military stalemate over mutual cooperation is possible if an outside power steps in to guarantee a 
peace agreement. Vital indicators of credible commitment that make circumstances favourable to 
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mutual cooperation are self-interest of the intervening party, sufficient military capability of the 
intervening party and host-state support from one of the two parties involved in the conflict. 
These indicators can reversely also explain why a number of current on-going civil wars are not 
yet resolved. For instance in the civil war in the Donbas region in Ukraine, the Russian state is 
supporting the pro-independence armed movement in eastern Ukraine, but it is not (yet) credibly 
committed to the solving of the conflict in favour of the rebel side. For Russia, the potential 
losses of intervention as a third-party are higher than it would gain from intervening in full 
military force. Losses would include international reprisal of the action, and potentially an armed 
conflict of a much bigger scale, which Russia cannot afford. For the US and NATO, the 
interventions as peace enforcement force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and Serbia 1999 were 
shows of credible commitment. In which the stakes at gain, for various reasons, were higher than 
the potential losses. 
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